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The Transposition and Efficacy of EU Rights. Indirect Effect and a 
Coming of Age of State Liability?   
  
  
ABSTRACT        
 
Throughout the duration of the UK’s membership of the European Union (EU), non-
implementation and incorrect transposition of Directives has been commonplace. 
Coupled with the Court of Justice of the European Union’s refusal to extend the 
direct effect of Directives to horizontal relationships, and historic difficulties in holding 
States liable in damages, it has often fallen to the national courts to give effect to EU 
laws through purposive statutory interpretation. Recent cases involving the collective 
redundancy of workers in the UK, and the High Court’s assessment of State Liability 
in the insurance sector (approved by the Court of Appeal), raise questions as to the 
efficacy of the current system of enforcement of EU law domestically. Despite the 
problems of access to EU rights experienced by workers in the UK, there appears to 
be hope that the judiciary is becoming more attuned to the relationship between EU 
and domestic laws, and are willing to take control of granting access to remedies 
without necessarily waiting for EU institutions to provide express permission or 
instruction. 2015 has thus far been a particularly important year in this regard. 
However, a systematic review of the UK’s transposition of EU law and the impact on 
individuals of the current suite of enforcement mechanisms is required if private 
enforcement of EU law is to provide the protection workers need and to which they 
are entitled. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There exists a limited but not insignificant trend of domestic legislators to incorrectly 
transpose, or fail to implement on time, EU Directives.1 The UK has a history of such 
ineffectual transposition, especially in the area of employment/social policy 
competence, and this negatively affects many workers given the EU’s role as a 
source of protective employment rights. Given the obligations imposed on individuals 
to follow EU laws, it is a necessary corollary that individuals have access to the 
rights derived from the EU – particularly when access to the right is dependent upon 
action by the Member State. Member States are entrusted with transposing, in good 
faith, EU laws in the form of Directives, and they should be required, not least 
through effective policing and enforcement, to meet these minimum standards. 
Member States that do not follow their EU obligations can often benefit economically 
from the breach, which necessitates an effective system of enforcement. 
Enforcement at both EU and domestic levels is required because, as demonstrated 
                                            
1
 For example, the UK’s transposition of the Acquired Rights Directive (ARD) (Directive 77/187/EC 
[1977] OJ L61/ 27) was belatedly implemented through The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations 1981. The delay, in part was due to a ‘lack of enthusiasm’ - comments 
made by the Minister, David Waddington (14 HC Deb 680, 8 December 1981). Amending legislation 
to the original ARD (Directive 98/50/EC [1998] OJ L201/ 88) was due to be transposed by 2001, but 
the UK did not comply until five years after this deadline (The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006 No.246)). 
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by Barnett, ‘wrongdoers will be less likely to engage in future illegal acts if the 
incentive of unjust enrichment is eliminated.’2 
 
There has been significant comment and critique of the effectiveness of the EU 
Commission3 and its role in enforcing EU law (through its infringement proceedings). 
This is a very complex issue, but, summarizing its shortcomings, the infrastructure of 
the institution, the increasing competence of the EU generally, the ‘political’ 
dimension to its infringement proceedings, and the growing number of Member 
States over which scrutiny must be exercised, has limited its effectiveness as the 
‘Guardian of the Treaties.’ The Commission’s role in enforcing EU law and ensuring 
Member States follow their obligations is of significance in relation to compelling 
States’ adherence to EU law, but this ‘EU level’ of enforcement does not explicitly 
take into account private parties and the effect on individuals’ access to EU law.4 
This paper focuses on the rights of private parties, such as workers, to access EU 
laws and critiques the current structure of domestic enforcement mechanisms in 
facilitating effective access.5 Given that the EU has been particularly active in 
developing a suite of employment rights under its social policy initiative, and most 
workers in the UK are employed in the private sector, the domestic level of 
enforcement is pertinent for examination due to cases heard in 2014/15. Two recent 
cases (discussed in this paper) exemplify the continued problem of the correct 
transposition of EU laws in the UK, identify a potential problem in full and effective 
access to EU law and, with the recent decision in Delaney,6 demonstrate perhaps a 
more enlightened, confident and informed judiciary emerging which is willing to hold 
the State liable in cases of incorrect transposition of Directives. For workers, who are 
largely unable to use direct effect of Directives due to the denial of its horizontal 
effect, and who have traditionally been reluctant to pursue a State Liability claim due 
to costs, complexity, the limited success of previous damages claims, the need for a 
separate legal action outside of the sphere of the original complaint, and the 
prohibitive issue of quantum when successful, the only remedy which has been of 
                                            
2
 Kerry Barnett, ‘Equitable Trusts: An Effective Remedy in Consumer Class Actions’ (1987) 96 Yale 
Law Journal 1591, 1595. 
3
 Melanie Smith, ‘Enforcement, monitoring, verification, outsourcing: the decline and decline of the 
infringement process’, (2008) 14 European Law Review 777 and Carol Harlow, and Richard 
Rawlings, ‘Accountability and Law Enforcement: The Centralised EU Infringement Procedure’ (2006) 
12 European Law Review 447. Further, the lack of transparency in proceedings was raised by the 
European Parliament in ‘Report on the 25th annual report from the Commission on monitoring the 
application of Community law (2007)’ A6-0245/2009 [13]. 
4
 As Van Harten and Nauta observe ‘Infringement proceedings under art.258 TFEU have not been 
modelled for the practices of private parties. They are aimed at Member State behaviour’. Herman 
Van Harten, and Thomas Nauta, ‘Towards Horizontal Direct Effect for the Free Movement of Goods? 
Comment on Fra.bo’ 38 European Law Review (2013) 677, 692. 
5
 Individuals were drafted into the enforcement of EU laws in national courts through the suite of 
enforcement mechanisms created by the Court of Justice. For a discussion of the EU utilizing rights, 
enforceable by individuals, to establish policy without the associated costs, see R. Daniel Kelemen 
‘Suing for Europe: Adversarial Legalism and European Governance’ (2006) Comparative Political 
Studies 39, 101. ‘By establishing EU rights and relying on private parties to enforce them, EU 
lawmakers can avoid the cost of funding the extensive Eurocracy and large-scale programs that 
would otherwise be necessary to implement and enforce policy. By presenting policy goals as 
individual rights that private actors and governments are obliged to respect, the EU can readily shift 
the costs of compliance to the private sector and member state governments.’ 105. 
6
 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] EWHC 1785 (QB); [2014] WLR (D) 253 and 
[2015] EWCA Civ 172. 
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any significant force has been indirect effect (adopting a purposive approach to 
statutory interpretation).7 
 
2 NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVES 
 
Each year, the EU produces data on infringement proceedings initiated by the 
Commission in reference to the non-transposition or late implementation of 
Directives.8 Non-implementation of Directives is a significant problem throughout the 
EU. The EU establishes a Directive (the parent law) which contains instructions to 
Member States as to the provisions which must be incorporated (transposed) into 
national law, and the deadline by which implementation must take effect. The 
principle of transposition is that the individual (here for example the worker) would 
access the right bestowed through the Directive by using the domestic transposing 
law (for example the relevant Regulation / Statutory Instrument etc). Without the 
timely transposition of the law, individuals who would wish to exercise those rights 
are denied access through national law and must instead rely on a ‘domestic-level’ 
enforcement mechanism to grant either access to the right or compensation in 
damages for associated losses due to the State’s breach. In 2013, the EU published 
74 Directives for implementation which led to 478 late transposition notices being 
issued against Member States.9 60 of the notices related to the EU’s area of 
competence in employment/social policy. The UK10 was subject to two cases (the 
joint highest total) by the Commission to the Court of Justice under its infringement 
proceedings authority, with a request for the application of a daily penalty under 
Article 260(3) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Further, in 
this year, the UK was subject to 53 infringement cases for incorrect transposition 
and/or the bad application of EU law.11  
 
The Commission possesses an ultimate discretion when deciding which cases on 
which to initiate any enforcement / infringement proceedings,12 and the Court of 
Justice has confirmed that it does not intend to publish details, following a request for 
access to Commission documents, relating to the investigation of a potential 
infringement of EU law by a Member State.13 Therefore, in the absence of certainty 
of effective enforcement via the Commission and Court of Justice, and due to the 
focus of Arts 258-260 TFEU on Member State compliance rather than individuals’ 
access to rights, it falls on the national courts to enable the access to non-
                                            
7
 Although see Lisa Schultz Bressman, and Abbe, R, Gluck, ‘Statutory Interpretation from the Inside – 
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II’ (2014) 66 Stanford 
Law Review 725 for an analysis and critique of the theories underpinning the textualist and purposivist 
approaches to statutory interpretation. The authors conclude that an alternative paradigm is required, 
adopting a pragmatic approach to interpretation. 
8
 The current annual report is: EU Commission (2014) ‘Report from the Commission: 31st Annual 
Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law (2013)’ Brussels, 1.10.2014 COM(2014) 612 final. 
9
 ibid, 3. 18 of these cases were against the UK, 4. 
10
 One of nine Member States. 
11
 n 8, 11. 
12
 As confirmed by the Court of Justice in Case 247/87 Star Fruit v Commission [1989] ECR 291-302 
[11]; Case C-87/89 Sonito and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I-1981 [6]; and Case C-111/11 P 
Ruipérez Aguirre and ATC Petition v Commission [2011] ECR I-104 [11 and 12]. 
13
 Joined Cases C-514/11 P and C-605/11 P Liga para a Proteç̃o da Natureza (LPN), Republic of 
Finland v European Commission [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:738. 
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implemented EU laws through an effective system of either purposive statutory 
interpretation or enforcement through a State Liability damages action. 
 
These data are included here to demonstrate the continued problems with the non-
implementation of Directives, despite the experience which Member States possess 
in transposing EU law, the softening of the approach of the Court of Justice in 
relation to accepting preliminary references and ensuring conformity of Member 
States’ legislative endeavours with the EU parent (although examples abound where 
the UK courts have been so sure that the interpretation provided in cases was 
certain and did not require reference14 (acte clair),15 only later16 to be established as 
an incorrect interpretation in relation to EU law),17 and the EU’s improvements in 
drafting Directives compared with, for example, the situation in the 1990s.18 It is 
important to note that these statistics consider the non-implementation of EU law by 
the Member State. Another considerable, perhaps arguably more significant 
problem, occurs with the incorrect transposition of EU law by the Member State due 
to the inherent nature of delays, obfuscation, and opacity that exists with a seemingly 
compliant transposition of the law but one which misleads the individuals subject to 
this law as to its content, scope and effect. 
 
3 INCORRECT TRANSPOSITION OF DIRECTIVES 
 
Directives are the most common EU legislative instrument (which provide for the 
harmonisation of laws throughout the EU and afford to Member States discretion as 
to the manner and form which the transposition takes). Compared with legislating 
through use of Regulations (which adopt a uniformity of approach to the law but in so 
doing neglect the variances and differing forms of legislative mechanisms in the 28 
Member States), Directives provide the benefit of enabling Member States to choose 
the most appropriate form of law-making at its disposal, select between any available 
compliance mechanisms19 or take advantage of derogations when transposing the 
effects of the Directive into national law. With any element of discretion in taking a 
                                            
14
 See Veerle Heyvaert, Justine Thornton and Richard Drabble ‘With Reference to the Environment: 
The Preliminary Reference Procedure, Environmental Decisions and the Domestic Judiciary’ (2014) 
130 Law Quarterly Review 413. 
15
 Established in Case C-283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982] 
ECR 341. 
16
 Including Royscot Leasing Ltd and others v Commissioners of Customs and Excise, Court of 
Appeal, 5 November 1998, FC3 98/7287/4; Customs and Excise v First Choice Holidays Plc, Court of 
Appeal (Civil Division), 7 March 2001, A3/2000/2534; Three Rivers District Council and others v The 
Governor and Company of the Bank of England, House of Lords, 2000 – particularly concerning here 
given the opinion to the contrary provided by Auld LJ in in the Court of Appeal (Three Rivers District 
Council and Others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 3) [2000] 2 WLR 15). 
17
 These examples have been referred to as ‘borderline cases’ and are commonly not referred to the 
CJEU under the reference procedure – see Tobias Lock ‘Is Private Enforcement of EU Law Through 
State Liability a Myth? An Assessment 20 Years After Francovich’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law 
Review 1675. 
18
 See Victor J.J.M. Bekkers, Jacqueline M. Bonnes, and Wim J.M. Voermans ‘Succes- en 
faalfactoren bij de uitvoering van EG-beleid, De uitvoering van EG-richtlijnen kwalitatief bezien’ (1993) 
Bestuurskunde 1993/4, 192, 193. 
19
 For example, as contained in the Collective Redundancies Directive - Council Directive 98/59/EC of 
20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective 
redundancies. Here the Directive gave Member States a legislative choice between two thresholds 
(and appropriate calculations) at which the duty to consult over collective redundancies was 
‘triggered.’ 
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legislative document and giving it effect in another form, correct transposition is not 
necessarily a simple task. Member States recognise that the deliberate non-
transposition of a Directive will likely satisfy the test of a sufficiently serious breach of 
EU law as required under the Brasserie20 criteria to facilitate a successful State 
Liability claim. Consequently, most Member States attempt some element of 
transposition (perhaps after the first (non-judicial / administrative) stage of the 
infringement proceedings), but the form of transposition adopted may be fully 
conformable, non-conformable or may involve a mere partial attempt at conformity, 
and each has significant implications for the access of individuals to the rights 
therein, and for a Member State’s potential liability for breach. König and Mäder’s21 
research demonstrates important aspects of the evaluation of conformable 
transposition of Directives and the limitations to effective analysis of compliance due 
to a lack of substantial data and information.22 Further, König and Mäder argue in 
relation to the motives behind incorrect transposition ‘the more a Member State 
disagrees with a Directive, the more conformable transposition is delayed.’23 It has 
been argued that where the Member State contested the nature of the Directive’s 
provisions and faced domestic political disquiet through transposition of an 
‘unpopular’ Directive, the conformable transposition was negatively affected.24 
Member States are required to notify the Commission regarding the mechanism 
chosen for the transposition of a Directive, and the form that such transposition has 
taken. This material is published in the Official Journal of the EU and assists in 
identifying the source Directive and domestic implementing measure. It may be 
assumed that a Member State establishes, where relevant, a new piece of 
legislation25 that transposes the Directive and this occurs once – the measures 
required to be transposed have been achieved. Of course, in reality, Member States 
may take several attempts26 to fully comply with the requirements of the Directive 
(possibly due to an innocent misunderstanding or misreading of the Directive’s 
provisions) and hence resubmit the notification to the Commission to reflect the 
changes. This, in particular, poses several problems for the effective regulation of 
the transposition process. A Member State with a political will not to fully transpose a 
                                            
20
 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur v Germany and R v Secretary of State 
for Transport, ex p. Factortame (III) [1996] ECR I-1029; [1996] 1 CMLR 889. 
21
 Thomas König, and Lars Mäder, ‘Non-Conformable, Partial and Conformable Transposition: A 
Competing Risk Analysis of the Transposition Process of Directives in the EU15’ (2013) 14 European 
Union Politics 46. 
22
 See Miriam Hartlapp, and Gerda Falkner, (2009) ‘Problems of Operationalisation and Data in EU 
Compliance Research’ 10 European Union Politics 281, 287. 
23
 n 21, 49. 
24
 See Clifford J. Carrubba, ‘Courts and Compliance in International Regulatory Regimes’ (2005) 67 
Journal of Politics 669; Gerda Falkner, Oliver Treib, Miriam Hartlapp, and Simone Leiber, Complying 
with Europe, (2005, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); and Thomas König and Brooke 
Luetgert, ‘Troubles with Transposition? Explaining Trends in Member State Notification and the 
Delayed Transposition of EU Directives’ (2009) 39 British Journal of Political Science 163. 
25
 Cleary, depending upon the nature and scope of the Directive’s provisions, a new legislative 
instrument may be required but this is not the situation in each case. Amending existing legislation 
can be a method adopted by the Member State, but the former action involves far greater uncertainty, 
costs and risks in conformable transposition than does the latter (see Brooke Luetgert, and Tanya 
Dannwolf, (2009) ‘Mixing methods: A Nested Analysis of EU Transposition Patterns’ (2009) 10 
European Union Politics 307. 
26
 See Tanja A. Boerzel, ‘Non-Compliance in the European Union: Pathology or Statistical Artifact?’ 
(2001) 8 Journal of European Public Policy 803. 
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Directive27 may choose a ‘quick and dirty’28 mechanism and notify the Commission 
that transposition has been achieved (when in reality this is non-conformable 
transposition). It is then incumbent on the Commission to identify the incorrect 
transposition and begin enforcement proceedings following the completion and, 
unsuccessful resolution, of the administrative stage of enforcement. This problem 
with transposition and the effective regulation at a Member State / EU level has led 
to a call ‘for a reform of the EU’s sanctioning mechanism to prevent disagreeing 
Member States from strategically early, but non-conformable, transposition 
notification.’29 It also justifies the development of the suite of domestic-level 
mechanisms to allow individuals to enforce EU-rights. 
 
4 PRIVATE / DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT  
 
In the UK many protective employment/social policy rights are inspired, and their 
application compelled, through membership of the EU. Various social policy 
Directives establishing protections from discrimination experienced on the basis of 
(for example) sexual orientation,30 beliefs and non-beliefs,31 because the individual 
works under a fixed term contract32 or is a part-time worker,33 have been 
incorporated into domestic law on the basis of a parent EU Directive. Further, 
fundamental protections on the requirements to preserve the rights and conditions of 
work attributed to employees following the transfer of a business from one owner to 
the next,34 and requirements to consult with employees and/or their representatives 
in the event of collective redundancies and/or transfers of an undertaking35 are also 
subject to a parent EU law. In the instances identified above, the UK has been found 
                                            
27
 See Robert Thompson, ‘Opposition Through the Back Door in the Transposition of EU Directives’ 
(2010) 11 European Union Politics 577, 591 ‘In the absence of explicit support for a provision from the 
Commission, states with incentives to deviate are three times more likely to exhibit protracted non-
compliance than are states without incentives to deviate.’ 
28
 n 21, 65. 
29
 n 21, 65. 
30
 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, Art 1, and transposed in the UK through the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and the Equality Act 2010. 
31
 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, Art 1. 
32
 Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term 
work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP OJ L 175/43, and transposed in the UK through The 
Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002. 
33
 Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-
time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC OJ L 14 and transposed in the UK through The 
Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000. 
34
 Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of businesses, OJ L 061, and Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on 
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights 
in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, OJ L 82.  
35
 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies, and transposed in the UK through The Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, amended by the Collective Redundancies and Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 1995 and The Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981, amended by the Collective 
Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 
1995 and 1999. 
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in breach of its obligations, with the result that individuals have been denied 
protection to which they were entitled.  
 
As is already very well known (and as such will be dealt here with brevity), the direct 
effect of EU law allows such laws to be relied upon, and given effect, in the national 
courts of the Member States. The Court of Justice created direct effect to facilitate 
access to EU law for individuals in their own national courts and, in relation to its 
extension to Directives, as this form of law is often drafted in general terms, so as to 
be given effect in the languages of the Official Journal, it enables harmonised 
policies to be applied throughout the EU’s Member States. The question as to 
whether EU laws have direct effect and are enforceable in a Member State was 
decided in cases in the early 1960s36 in which the foundations of a Community 
governed by the rule of law were firmly based on the primacy of Community law. 
Indeed, in relation to access to EU laws and associated rights, Szyszczak37 identified 
that direct effect was used not to enforce individual rights from ‘legally perfect’ 
Community measures, but rather to interact with national laws in order to provide 
effective enforcement of substantive Community laws. Direct effect is used, 
therefore, to ensure that superior Community norms are enforced.38 
 
Initially, direct effect was applied, subject to the qualifying criteria,39 to Treaty 
Articles, and later to Directives.40 Given the volume of EU law passed in the form of 
Directives, this was an important movement towards accessing rights for individuals, 
but was made problematic due to the denial of the horizontal direct effect of 
Directives,41 (despite arguments being presented to the contrary by Advocates-
General)42 and necessitated the ‘remedy’43 of the extension of the concept of the 
                                            
36
 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR1, [1963] 
CMLR105; Case 6/64 Costa (Flaminio) v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, [1964] CMLR 425, and Case 11/70 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fuer Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1970] ECR 1125, [1972] CMLR 255. 
37
 Erika Szyszczak,’ Making Europe More Relevant to its Citizens: Effective Judicial Process’ (1996) 
21 European Law Review 351. 
38
 ibid at 358. 
39
 The criteria for the direct effect of Community law to be established were: 1. The provision must be 
clear and unambiguous; 2. The provision must be unconditional; and 3. The provision must not be 
dependent on further action being taken by the EU or Member State. 
40
 Although see Bob Hepple and Angela Byre, ‘EEC Labour Law in the United Kingdom - A New 
Approach’ 18 Industrial Law Journal (1989), 129, 131 for a critique of the inequalities in the use of the 
Court of Justice’s own criteria for establishing the direct effect of Directives. The article is relatively 
old, identifying subsequently repealed legislation, but through the following example of the Court of 
Justice’s double standards, demonstrate a problem in consistency of approach and rationale 
explanation and justification for its decision-making. Article 119 (Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena 
[1976] ECR 455, [1976] 2 CMLR 98) and Directive 75/117 (Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 
February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of 
the principle of equal pay for men and women) ‘which facilitates the practical application of Article 
119’ both having been granted with the status of being horizontally directly effective, whilst Directive 
76/207 (Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions) was only judged to possess vertical direct effect (Case 152/84 
Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Health Authority [1986] ECR 723). 
41
 Case C-91/92 Dori (Faccini) v Recreb Srl [1994] ECR I-3325. 
42
 See opinions of A-G Jacobs in Case C-316/93, Vaneetveld v SA Le Foger [1994] ECR I-763, 2 
CMLR 852 and A-G Lenz in Case 91/92 Faccini Dori [1994] ECR I-3325. 
43
 Despite the lack of horizontal application of Directives, it has been argued that the Marleasing 
decision was in essence a de facto horizontal application of a Directive. See John, J, Barceló III, ‘The 
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‘emanation of the State’44 to facilitate the vertical45 direct effect of Directives.46 Either 
through intention or by default of Member State pressure, the EU has created a twin 
track of rights in individuals accessing EU law directly in their national court in the 
event of the non-implementation or incorrect transposition of EU law. The resultant 
access to the direct effect of Directives, dependent as it is on whether the defendant 
is a public or private sector entity, required the Court of Justice to establish a second 
enforcement mechanism – statutory interpretation/indirect effect. 
 
5 INDIRECT EFFECT 
 
Membership of the EU establishes the supremacy of EU law over inconsistent 
domestic law47 and obliges Member States to interpret domestic legislation48 in 
conformity49 with the EU parent ‘as far as it is possible to do so’.50 Judgments of the 
House of Lords in Duke v GEC Reliance51 and Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd (No. 
2)52 had determined the judiciary’s unwillingness to distort the ordinary meaning of a 
statute to achieve compliance with a Directive. However, in Litster v Forth Dry Dock 
& Engineering Co Ltd,53 an exception to this approach was established where the 
domestic legislation was clearly intended to transpose the Directive. Ghaidan also 
enables the interpretation process to add and remove words to facilitate compliance. 
Underhill P, in EBR Attridge LLP v Coleman54 found nothing ‘impossible’55 about 
                                                                                                                                       
Paradox of Excluding WTO Direct and Indirect Effect in U.S. Law’ (2006) Cornell Law Faculty 
Publications Paper 9. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/9, 151. 
44
 Defined by the Court of Justice as ‘a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made 
responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the state, for providing a public service under the 
control of the state and has for that purpose special powers beyond that which result from the normal 
rules applicable in relations between individuals.’ E.g. a former nationalized utility company - Case C–
188/89 Foster v British Gas plc. [1990] ECR I–3313; health authorities - Case 152/84 Marshall v 
Southampton and South-West Hampshire Health Authority [1986] ECR 723; local government bodies 
- Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR  I-1839; and a police force – Case 
C-222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the RUC [1986] ECR 1651. 
45
 Vertical direct effect was attributed to Directives by the Court of Justice in Case 41/74 Van Duyn v 
Home Office [1974] ECR 1337, 1 CMLR 1 [1975]. 
46
 However, the Court of Justice has been relatively unhelpful, despite exploring concepts of State 
and public bodies, on providing detailed guidance on this important issue – see Erika Ssyszczak, 
‘Foster v British Gas’ (1990) 27 Common Market Law Review 859. 
47
 Declaration 17, annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which Adopted the 
Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007, concerning primacy ‘… in accordance with well 
settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Treaties and the law adopted by 
the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States, under the 
conditions laid down by the said case law’. 
48
 The obligation does not extend to nullify the law, but rather ‘… the national court is, however, 
obliged to disapply that (incompatible) rule, provided always that this obligation does not restrict the 
power of the competent national courts to apply, from among the various procedures available under 
national law, those which are appropriate for protecting the individual rights conferred by Community 
law’. (Cases C-10-22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.’90 Srl [1998] ECR I-6307, [21]; Case C-
314/08 Krzysztof Filipiak, 19 November 2009 [18]. 
49
 Or, in other words, to fulfill the (doctrine of) consistent interpretation of ALL sources of EU law (cf. 
Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981). 
50
 Similar to the duty of interpretation of the Human Rights Act 1998 s. 3 as articulated in 
Ghaidan v Godin‑ Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557. 
51
 [1988] AC 618, HL. 
52
 [1995] IRLR 647. 
53
 [1990] 1 AC 546, HL. 
54
 [2010] ICR 242. 
55
 ibid [14]. 
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taking such an approach in relation to the interpretation of EU-based law. Further, 
safeguards were provided by Lord Nichols and Lord Rodger in Ghaiden, where they 
said, respectively, that indirect effect of the EU law could be achieved where the 
interpretation was not ‘(in)compatible with the underlying thrust of the legislation’;56 
or ‘inconsistent with the scheme of the legislation or with its general principles’.57 In 
EBR Attridge LLP, Underhill P, continued that the interpretation of domestic law to 
give effect to EU law was ‘… an extension of the scope of the legislation as enacted, 
but it is in no sense repugnant to it.’58 Marleasing SA v La 
Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA provided further scope for the effective 
enforcement of EU law as it permitted courts to insert ‘additional words... They could 
be taken out; they can be moved around’.59 
 
Indirect effect has been a particularly effective enforcement mechanism, but this 
does not mean that it is a panacea for the intransigence of Member States, it does 
not mean that national courts are free from doubt as to the application of the 
domestic enforcement mechanisms, nor does it necessarily provide access to the 
law for all affected individuals.  
 
6 WOOLWORTHS AND THE CONTINUED PROBLEMS OF 
TRANSPOSITION AND ENFORCEMENT 
 
The significance, and limitations, of indirect effect of Directives as a powerful 
enforcement mechanism can be seen in USDAW v Ethel Austin Ltd and WW 
Realisation 1 Ltd60 (hereafter referred to as Woolworths), a case heard in the EAT 
and Court of Appeal (and subject to a preliminary reference at the Court of Justice). 
Woolworths related to the construction of s.188 of the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act (TULRCA) 199261 and its EU parent – the Collective 
Redundancies Directive (Directive 98/59/EC).62  
 
TULRCA 1992 s.188 reads:  
 
(1) Where an employer is proposing to dismiss as redundant 20 or more 
employees at one establishment (authors’ emphasis) within a period of 90 
days or less, the employer shall consult about the dismissals all the persons 
who are appropriate representatives63 of any of the employees who may be 
                                            
56
 ibid [33]. 
57
 ibid [121]. 
58
 ibid [14]. 
59
 ibid [49]. 
60
 USDAW v Ethel Austin Ltd (In Administration) [2013] UKEAT/0547/12/KN, and USDAW and Wilson v 
Unite the Union, WW Realisation 1 Ltd and Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills [2013] 
UKEAT/0548/12/KN. 
61
 The Act gives implementation in the United Kingdom of the 1975 Collective Redundancies Directive 
and the 1977 Acquired Rights Directive (Council Directive 77/187/EEC). 
62
 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies. 
63
 The original wording of s.188, amended following enactment of the Trade Union Reform and 
Employment Rights Act 1993 and proceedings to the Court of Justice, had restricted the consultation 
requirements to a single redundant employee who was represented by a recognised independent 
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[affected by the proposed dismissals or may be affected by measures taken in 
connection with those dismissals]… before the first of the dismissals takes 
effect. 
 
Therefore, an employer, when proposing to make collective redundancies, is 
required under TULRCA 1992 to consult with representatives of the affected 
employees before decisions to dismiss, and notices to this effect, are issued. The 
periods for consultation (at the time of the redundancies being made) were 60 days’ 
notice where between 20-99 employees were subject to redundancy, and 90-days’ 
notice for situations involving 100+ employees. In the event that the employer fails in 
this duty, a system of redress (through ‘protective awards’)64 is available for the 
affected employees.  
 
However, the parent Directive (98/59/EC) was arguably much broader in scope. The 
Directive provided Member States with a choice of two mechanisms for 
implementation which would trigger the consultation duty. Per Article 1(1):  
 
(a) collective redundancies means dismissals effected by an employer… 
where, according to the choice of the Member States, the number of 
redundancies is: 
(i) either, over a period of 30 days: at least 10 in establishments normally 
employing more than 20 and less than 100 workers; at least 10% of the 
number of workers in establishments normally employing at least 100 but less 
than 300 workers; at least 30 in establishments normally employing 300 
workers or more;  
(ii) or, over a period of 90 days, at least 20, whatever the number of workers 
normally employed in the establishments in question. 
 
Whilst many Member States chose the first definition in their transposition of when 
the consultation duty was effective, the UK used the second. 
 
The key issue for Woolworths was the wording of TULRCA 1992 s.188 which 
triggered the duty to consult where the requisite collective redundancies took effect 
‘at one establishment’. The consequence of the UK’s transposition is employees 
subject to collective redundancies only have protection through the consultation 
procedure (and associated protective awards for failure by the employer to comply) 
where the collective redundancy involving at least 20 employees occurs at one 
branch/premises rather than across an organization. Branches/shops engaging 
fewer than 20 employees resulted in no duty to consult applying. In Woolworths, 
nearly 4,500 employees were in this position and they sought a protective award on 
the basis of TULRCA 1992 being incompatible with EU law. The EAT agreed, re-
wording the Act (the EAT65 referred to Kükükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG66 
                                                                                                                                       
trade union - Court of Justice of the European Union in cases C382/92 and C383/92, Commission of 
the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [1994] ICR 664. 
64
 Where an employer has failed in the duty established in s.188 to consult regarding collective 
redundancies, a complaint may be presented and the effect of s.189 is a tribunal must make a 
declaration and a protective award where it finds the complaint by a trade union or worker(s) or the 
workers’ representatives well founded. 
65
 n 60. 
66
 [2010] IRLR 346. 
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when identifying the approach to be taken when the domestic Act and the EU parent 
law could not be reconciled. It specifically made reference to paragraph 51 of the 
judgment whereby the instruction for domestic courts was to disapply legislation that 
was contrary to directly effective EU law.)67 It considered it possessed authority 
through the case law of the Court of Justice to take this action, but the Secretary of 
State and the employer disagreed. The rationale for the appeal and the querying of 
the EAT’s action was because the UK had a choice between two alternative 
calculations to reach the trigger point when consultation would be required in the 
event of a collective redundancy. The UK used clear wording that ‘at one 
establishment’ could mean just that – the requirement to consult in collective 
redundancies was restricted to calculation at each establishment, not across 
establishments.68 Given the parliamentary choice of wording, and given that the UK 
has articulated in more recent guidance that, where possible, it will copy, word-for-
word,69 the provisions of the EU Directive required to be transposed so as to go no 
further than its legal obligations, it must be considered that the legislators made a 
positive and calculated decision in the differing wording ‘establishments’ and ‘at one 
establishment.’ This was all the more confusing given that the first option of 
transposition is also the only one which articulates a calculation of redundancies as 
the trigger point at a particular location – the second option available in the Directive 
(as chosen by the UK) simply identifies a consultation requirement occurring 
‘whatever the number of workers normally employed in the establishments in 
question.’ 
 
After a finding that the UK had incorrectly transposed the Directive, the EAT felt 
compelled70 to interpret TULRCA 1992 s.188 to remove the offending passage ‘at 
one establishment’.71 This form of statutory interpretation was used as settled case 
law prevented the application of the Directive between the individuals and the 
employer/insolvency practitioners (horizontal effect between private parties), and 
even though the EAT forwarded the possibility of the vertical direct effect of the 
Directive due to the State being embroiled in the case,72 it would be open to question 
whether the State’s involvement in this capacity would satisfy the tests as outlined in 
Brasserie du Pêcheur v Germany and R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. 
                                            
67
 As previously stated by Lord Nicholls in Autologic Holdings v IRC [2006] 1 AC 118 HL [16]. 
68
 Per Barceló III, John J., ‘The Paradox of Excluding WTO Direct and Indirect Effect in U.S. Law’ 
(2006) Cornell Law Faculty Publications Paper 9. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/9  ‘In other 
words, the ECJ would not force national judges to make a mockery of “interpretation” in order to bring 
national law into conformity. In sum, despite the latent force and importance of indirect effect, it has 
implicit limits’, 152. 
69
 ‘… when transposing EU law, the Government will: (d) always use copy-out for transposition where 
it is available, except where doing so would adversely affect UK interests e.g. by putting UK 
businesses at a competitive disadvantage compared with their European counterparts or going 
beyond the minimum requirements of the measure that is being transposed.’ HM Government. 
Department for Business Innovation & Skills (2013) ‘Transposition Guidance: How to implement 
European Directives effectively’ URN 11/775, 3. 
70
 The requirement to consistently interpret the law was established throughout case law of the Court 
of Justice and, given that in Case C-177/88 Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassenen [1990] ECR I-3941 the national law of the Netherlands was interpreted almost contra 
legem, the EAT’s interpretation certainly could not be argued to have extend that far. 
71
 ‘We hold that the words “at one establishment” should be deleted from section 188 as a matter of 
construction pursuant to our obligations to apply the Directive’s purpose.’ [53]. 
72
 Due to Part XII ss.182 and 189 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 where the Secretary of State 
underwrites claims from individuals owed wages / payments from their insolvent employer. 
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Factortame (III).73 However, returning to the concept of the doctrine of consistent 
interpretation of domestic legislation, even had the offending passage from national 
law not been removed, case law also requires the national court to interpret the 
domestic law in ‘the light of the wording and the purpose of the Directive so as to 
achieve the result it has in view and thereby comply with the third paragraph of 
Article 189 of the EC Treaty.’74 
 
The EAT considered it had little choice75 but to change the wording of TULRCA 1992 
to give effect to the Directive, and despite the appeal being allowed to the Court of 
Appeal, the EAT expressed that it was unlikely that the Court of Appeal would accept 
the (defendant) Secretary of State’s argument to successfully challenge the 
interpretation given by the EAT.76 Woolworths joined an existing case77 with a 
reference to the Court of Justice on the same matter of interpretation of TULRCA 
1992 s. 188. However, when referring questions to the EAT, which the EAT 
accepted78 and had been considered in the submission to the Court of Appeal (and 
even on to the Court of Justice),79 the representatives of the workers argued for the 
vertical direct effect of the Directive against the Secretary of State (who was joined 
as defendant to the case due to Employment Rights Act 1996 s.184(2)(d) which 
provides for the Secretary of State to become liable to satisfy the protective award 
on the insolvency of an employer/debtor). It was assumed that simply because the 
Secretary of State has a presence in proceedings, this body must be held as an 
emanation of the State and/or the Directive may be applied against him (despite the 
obvious fact that a direct effect action is one against (in employment cases) an 
employer and a claim against the State is only permitted by a separate public law 
action for damages in the modified tort of breach of statutory duty. An argument on 
this point would be likely from prospective claimants, but it should have been dealt 
with (and answered in the negative) by the EAT. That the EAT entertained the 
                                            
73
 See Case C-392/93 The Queen v HM Treasury, ex parte British Telecommunications [1996] ECR I-
1631. In the matter affecting Woolworths and Ethel Austin, it is questionable whether the incorrect 
transposition of the Direction in TULRCA 1992 was a justifiable error – differences between joined 
Cases C-283, 291 and 292/94 Denkavit International BV and others v Bundesamt Fur Finanzen 
[1996] ECR I-5063 and s.188 exist. 
74
 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) Case C-456/98 Centrosteel Srl v Adipol GmbH [2000] ECR 
I-6007, [16]. Art. 189 now Art. 288 TFEU. 
75
 Case C-449/93, Rockfon A/S v Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark (Nielsen) [1995] ECR I-4291 – 
‘The national court is bound, when applying provisions of domestic law predating or postdating the 
said Directive, to interpret those provisions, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose 
of the Directive, so that those provisions are applied in a manner consistent with the result pursued by 
the Directive.’ [19]. 
76
 Indeed, in the Practice Direction, Judge McMullen QC observed that the Secretary of State 
identified only one new argument in its appeal, a point relating to the archaeology of the phrase ‘one 
establishment.’ 
77
 Lyttle and others v Bluebird UK Bidco 2 Ltd [2013] NIIT 00555_12IT. 
78
 Although the EAT stated that it was minded to agree with this argument, albeit ‘with slightly less 
confidence’ [62]. 
79
 USDAW and Another v Ethel Austin Ltd and Others [2014] EWCA Civ 142 LJ Kay remarked ‘The 
submission for the employees on this point, "vertical direct effect", is said to gain support from Foster 
v British Gas [1990] ECR 13313.  The EAT accepted this submission, albeit "with slightly less 
confidence."  In my view, it would be appropriate for this question to be the subject of the reference.  It 
is not currently before the CJEU in the Lyttle case.  The Court may take the view that vertical direct 
effect does not yet arise in this case, but the point is not free from doubt.  Accordingly, if my Lord and 
my Lady agree, I would make a reference in relation to the construction of the Directive and the 
vertical direct effect point.’ [12]. 
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argument, demonstrating a level of misunderstanding by it (and indeed by the Court 
of Appeal) is quite worrying, despite its protestations that it would be an argument 
unlikely to succeed. The duty to consult rests with the employer. The obligation to 
pay a protective award for breach of the consultation duty applies, first, to the 
employer, and upon his insolvency, to the Secretary of State. Hence, attempting to 
impose a duty to consult on the Secretary of State through vertical direct effect fails 
to recognise the nature of the enforcement mechanism, the distinction between the 
duty and obligation, and that the Secretary of State cannot owe a responsibility to the 
claimants in this regard. The Secretary only becomes a party to proceedings after 
the employer’s breach of the duty and not until the employer’s insolvency has 
occurred. 
 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal80 referred the matter of the construction of s. 188 to 
the Court of Justice, which provided its ruling on 30 April 2015.81 This resulted in a 
very narrow interpretation of the term ‘establishment’ in the Directive and s. 188, and 
ultimately a ruling that the UK’s transposition was correct. This decision was largely 
welcomed by the business community, if not so by employees and trades unions. 
 
Woolworths is an interesting case in the clear differing approach between the UK 
courts and the Court of Justice and its powers of interpretation. Adopting a narrow 
approach has essentially prevented 71% of the redundant staff at Ethel Austin and 
12% of the employees made redundant by Woolworths receiving a protective award. 
Coupled with the traditional problems and limitations with State Liability as providing 
a route to an effective remedy for the consequences of the State’s breach of EU law, 
this paints a dismal picture of protection for vulnerable individuals. Until recently, 
workers seeking such a remedy would have needed to prepare themselves for a 
battle through domestic courts, with references to EU institutions along the way, 
before a remedy was made available by an appeal court. Since 2014, case law 
appears to have established an easier and more accessible path. 
 
7 DELANEY – THE FUTURE OF STATE LIABILITY? 
 
Francovich82 is where the Court of Justice expressed83 ‘the effectiveness84 of [EU] 
rules would be impaired and the protection of the rights which they grant would be 
weakened if individuals were unable to obtain compensation when their rights are 
                                            
80
 September 10 2013 - The EAT gave the Government leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal - 
despite the fact that the Government did not attend the EAT hearing. In granting leave, Judge 
McMullen QC remarked reasons for the permission included ‘… a parallel reference to the Court of 
Justice, the importance of the legal issue to industry, and the value of the claims.’ (Appeal Nos. 
UKEAT/0547/12/GE and UKEAT/0548/12/GE Directions Hearing). However, a condition of permission 
being granted was the Secretary of State indemnify the claimants for their reasonable costs in the 
Court of Appeal nor would he seek costs if successful. 
81
 C-80/14 - USDAW and Wilson. 
82
 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci and others v Italy [1991] ECR 1-5357. 
83
 Although the Court of Justice, had, in Case 6/60 Humblet v Belgium [1960] ECR 559, p. 569 
established the duty on Member States to make good damage incurred due to national laws 
conflicting with EU law. 
84
 Although, despite arguments as to its success (see e.g. Roberto Caranta, ‘Judicial Protection 
Against Member States: A New Jus Commune Takes Shape’, (1995) 32 Common Market Law 
Review 703, 725; Fernand Schockweiler, ‘La responsabilité de l’autorité nationale en cas de violation 
du droit communautaire’ (1992) 28 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 27, 42), it is arguable that 
such effectiveness has never been realised. 
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infringed by a breach of [EU] law for which a Member State can be held 
responsible.’85 The judgment established that individuals who sustained loss due to 
a breach of EU law by a Member State (in Francovich this was the non-
implementation of a Directive) had the right to be compensated by the State (which 
was obliged to make good any loss / damage86 sustained by the claimant). In the 
UK, like many of the Member States, such an action for damages against the State 
for a failure to legislate was alien and required the creation87 of a remedy based on a 
hybrid fusion of English and EU law in non-contractual / tortious liability.88 In the UK, 
this involves actions under a modified breach of statutory duty and is justified on the 
principles of equivalence89 and effectiveness.90  
 
In Francovich, the Court of Justice outlined the tests of which the national court had 
to be satisfied before holding the State liable for damages, and in Delaney, the court 
referred91 to Francovich, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Federal Republic of Germany, 
and R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame,92 which identified the 
modern application of the tests to be satisfied: 
 
1. The rule of law infringed must have intended to confer the rights of individuals; 
2. The breach must be sufficiently serious; and 
3. There must exist a direct causal link between the breach of the EU law and 
the damage sustained by the claimant. 
 
Delaney is, in some respects, a fascinating case where the individual not only 
successfully met the requirements for the recovery of damages under a State 
Liability claim, but also managed to achieve this feat in the absence of the 
Commission and Court of Justice holding the UK being in breach of EU law. 
 
Delaney concerned an individual who was involved, as a front seat passenger, in a 
road traffic accident in 2006. The consequence of the accident left the claimant with 
                                            
85
 Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian 
Republic [1991] ECR I-5357 [33].  
86
 As quoted in Francovich, the Treaty on European Union, Art.4(3) requires ‘The Member States shall 
take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out 
of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The(y)… shall facilitate the 
achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment 
of the Union’s objectives.’ [36]. 
87
 A national system establishing and facilitating the award of a remedy was required, however, given 
the unique nature of the effects of Francovich, and its adoption by Member States to be lukewarm at 
best, by 1997, no Member State had introduced any legislative measures to give effect to this 
development in EU law (SOU ‘Det Allmannas Skadestandsansvar vid Overtradelse av EG-regler’ 
1997, 194). 
88
 Although not every breach / infringement of EU law by a Member State constitutes a tort - Borgouin 
S. A. and Others v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1986] QB 716. 
89
 In relation to anti-trust / competition law, the principle requires Member states to sanction breaches 
of the EU law in the same way, and thereby equivalent to, the application of domestic law. 
90
 A national court must not make it impossible of excessively difficult for a party to exercise his or her 
EU rights – see Francovich [33] and [39]. Further, In Autologic Holdings Plc v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners [2004] EWCA Civ 690 [2004] 2 All ER 957 Gibson LJ stated: ‘The importance of the 
principle of effectiveness in Community law cannot be overstated. Any provision of national law which 
makes the exercise of a right conferred by Community law practically impossible or extremely difficult 
cannot prevail.’ [25]. 
91
 at [51]. 
92
 n 20. 
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significant personal injury. The driver of the vehicle was insured by a company 
(Tradewise Insurance Services Ltd) which attempted to avoid its contractual 
obligations under the contract of insurance on two bases - that the policy had been 
obtained through be nondisclosure of material facts; and secondly that the driver’s 
health and use of a controlled drug (cannabis) was falsely represented to the insurer. 
 
The claimant initially brought proceedings against both the driver and Tradewise in 
which it was held the claim must fail due to 1) the application of ex turpi causa non 
oritur actio93 and 2) that the claimant knew/ought to have known that the vehicle was 
being used in the course or furtherance of a crime which would negate the 
insurance. It transpires that the driver of the car was, at the time of the crash, 
transporting a quantity of cannabis for the purpose of subsequent supply. The Court 
of Appeal94 overturned the findings on the first point whilst upholding the second 
(although this was based on the application of national implementing law and no 
consideration was given to the conformity of national law with the EU parent 
Directive). Hence the liability of Tradewise was excluded.  
 
Delaney’s case, significant as it is for the High Court holding the State liable for 
breach of EU law, was based on the UK’s transposition of Directive 2009/103/EC95 
which, in essence, allowed Tradewise to exclude its liability under national law. The 
Directive required the Member States to take appropriate measures to ensure that 
civil liability in relation to personal injury and damage to property in respect of the 
use of motor vehicles was covered by insurance. The Directive also extended 
responsibility for insurance to passengers in the vehicles and the UK transposed the 
Directive provisions through Part IV of the Road Traffic Act (RTA) 1988, and within 
the RTA 1988, s. 152(2) provided insurers with the right to avoid insurance contracts 
where the contract was obtained on the basis of the non-disclosure/false 
representation of a material fact. One saving feature of the UK’s transposition is by 
the development of the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement (UDA) whereby the UK’s 
Motor Insurance Bureau (MIB) acts as the ‘insurer of last resort’ in cases where 
insurance claims would not be satisfied – for example where a driver has no 
insurance or, as with Delaney, where the insurer avoided the contract of insurance. 
However, and again notably to Delaney, the responsibility of the MIB to satisfy 
claims in the event of no insurance being available was not applied without 
reservation, and one such reservation applied to passengers in claims against the 
driver (contained in clause 6(1)(e)(iii) UDA) – here MIB’s liability was excluded in the 
event that the passenger knew/ought to have known that the vehicle he/she was 
travelling in was being used in the course or furtherance of a crime (the crime 
exception).96 
                                            
93
 From a dishonorable cause an action does not arise. 
94
 Delaney v Picket [2011] EWCA Civ 1532. 
95
 The law in the UK relating to insurance had been largely the same since the Road Traffic Act 1930 
(as amended in 1934), with only minor amendments incorporated following each Directive. Whilst the 
UK did not transpose the effects of the Directive through the Road Traffic Act 1988, Delaney’s case 
against the State was justified on the existence of the effects of three Directives (Directive 
72/166/EEC, Directive 84/5/EEC and Directive 90/232/EEC) - subsequently replaced by Directive 
2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to 
insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the 
obligation to insure against such liability. 
96
 The Uninsured Drivers' Agreement England, Scotland and Wales 1999 introduced the criminality 
exclusion, seemingly at the confusion of commentators at the time. EU law did not permit it, its 
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As Delaney was unable to seek redress against Tradewise or MIB due to the 
reservation above (as confirmed by the Court of Appeal) a new action was initiated 
against the Secretary of State for Transport under State Liability.97 The High Court 
had to consider two issues - the first dealt with the crime exception to the insurance 
company and if its existence resulted in the UK being in breach of the EU Directive. 
Secondly, if that issue was answered in the affirmative, the question then arose 
whether the Secretary of State was liable to the claimant for losses suffered as a 
consequence of this breach. The first issue was answered in the affirmative on the 
basis that the Directive required a national body to cover claims of victims of road 
traffic accidents in circumstances where such claims were not covered by insurers - 
but this was limited to cases where no insurance policy existed. However the High 
Court98 held that this did not mean that Member States’ obligations were limited to 
situations where the contract of insurance never existed. Decisions of the Court of 
Justice previously referred to situations where an insurer’s avoidance of liability, 
which results in the victim being left without a remedy, could not exist. So, the 
interpretation of the text of the Directive and the UK's interpretation of such was 
rejected as being adopted on an ‘overly punctilious textual approach’,99 as was the 
extension of the crime exception permitted in the Directive and enacted in national 
law.100 
 
7.1 A SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUS BREACH? 
 
Having held101 that the UK was in ‘plain breach’ of its EU obligations, the second 
issue regarding the seriousness of this breach was assessed. In so doing, the Court 
referred102 to the Francovich, Brasserie, and Factortame tests. That the Directive 
intended to confer rights on individuals (test 1) and the existence of a direct causal 
link between the breach and the damage sustained (test 3) were satisfied without 
need for anything other than an application of these legal principles to the facts of 
the case. The issue considered in depth was the second test – as historically it has 
been the most problematic issue as it rests with the claimant to demonstrate that the 
State’s breach of EU law was ‘sufficiently serious.’103   
 
                                                                                                                                       
inclusion was hence in violation of the UK’s EU obligations, and it appeared a matter of time before 
either the UK would have to change national law to comply with the Directives through choice, 
enforcement through proceedings brought by the Commission, or through a private claim through 
indirect effect or State Liability. 
97
 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] EWHC 1785 (QB); [2014] WLR (D) 253.  
98
 at [60]. 
99
 at [65-68]. 
100
 at [68-71]. 
101
 at [72]. 
102
 at [51]. 
103
 The Court of Justice has provided guidance as to the factors to be taken into consideration when 
assessing the existence of a sufficiently serious breach – ‘Those factors include, in particular, in 
addition to the clarity and precision of the rule infringed and the measure of discretion left by that rule 
to the national authorities, whether the infringement or the damage caused was intentional or 
involuntary, whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable, and the fact that the position 
taken by a Community institution may have contributed towards the adoption or maintenance of 
national measures or practices contrary to Community law.’ Case C-278/05 Robins v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions [2007] ECR I-1053 [77]. 
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In the first 20 years of the availability of redress through State Liability, a mere 22 
cases were heard before English courts,104 and of these, a total of 9 were successful 
in obtaining a remedy for the claimant. These figures paint a picture of selective and 
frequent non-implementation and incorrect transposition of EU law, necessitating 
claimants’ attempts to recover losses associated with the breach. The peculiarity and 
uncommon nature of State Liability as a remedy had led to a general lack of 
accessibility or success. Many actions for State Liability involved the State’s incorrect 
transposition of EU law, and, whilst discretion and interpretation are natural aspects 
of many Directives, this did not mean that the State would have an unquestioning 
defence when arguing about ‘possible’ implementation strategies/techniques. In one 
of the successful damages actions, Sullivan J remarked:  
 
Whilst the mere breach of Community law will not be enough to fix the State 
with liability, the mere fact that the State is able to advance an arguable case 
in litigation does not mean that the breach is not 'sufficiently serious'. Given 
the lack of precision in many Directives it will not be too difficult for a 
Government to construct some argument in favour of a particular 
interpretation…’105 Further ‘The justification, as it emerged during the course 
of litigation, was arguable, but it should have been realised that it did not have 
a realistic, much less a good, prospect of success before the ECJ.106  
 
It also is important to consider that simply because the State has obtained 
independent advice prior to enactment of a national law does not render an 
impossibility of a finding of a sufficiently serious breach. In R v Secretary of State for 
Transport ex p. Factortame Ltd (No.5) the Government had sought independent 
legal advice as to its interpretation of the EU law in its transposition. However, this 
argument was not accepted by the House of Lords in establishing a defence against 
the State’s liability as it was clear the provisions of the UK’s law were discriminatory 
on the basis of nationality, a point expressed by the Commission to the UK prior to 
the UK’s Act receiving Royal Assent. Ignoring such advice is within the remit of the 
transposing State, but in so doing the State runs the risk that it will have breached 
EU law, and to an extent that makes the breach ‘manifest and grave’ (per Lord Slynn 
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– although disagreed with by Hoffmann and Clyde). Similarly in Byrne v Motor 
Insurers' Bureau107 (and Evans v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions), like Delaney, claims in the insurance sector, the UK was held 
liable for damages to the claimant as it was aware of the Court of Justice’s 
interpretation108 of the Directive and this should have prompted the Government of 
the risk it was running in applying national law which was contrary to the Directive. 
 
Despite these successful claims, the majority of State Liability actions have failed. In 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Gallagher, Gallagher’s action 
for damages against the UK was unsuccessful as the UK’s incorrect transposition of 
Directive 64/221 on the free movement of persons was not sufficiently serious. The 
Court held that the UK did not willfully deprive individuals of rights conferred by the 
Directive and whilst there was evidence of a manifest departure from the content of 
the Directive in the UK’s transposition, this was not considered to be ‘grave.’109 In R 
v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex p. Lay and Gage, a similar 
conclusion was drawn as the UK’s interpretation was not ‘untenable.’ In comparison, 
in The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas 
(Ireland) Ltd,110 the Court considered that where a Member State possessed a 
reduced discretion, or particularly where no discretion existed in the requirement for 
transposition, such an infringement may, of itself, amount to a sufficiently serious 
breach.111 Therefore, when determining a sufficiently serious breach of EU law, the 
Court held that the UK did possess legislative choice, and whilst the transposition 
was wrong, it was not ‘obviously wrong’ in substance, nor was there a ‘blatant’ 
breach of EU law.112 The action for damages failed, although, as with the EAT’s 
assessment of the application of EU law in Woolworths, here the English Court 
appeared to misunderstand the extent or application of EU law (a point made by the 
Court of Justice).  
 
The reason for its complexity in successfully holding the State liable in damages for 
breach of EU law lies in the discretion that is provided in Directives. Returning to 
Delaney, the Court referred to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and 
compared and contrasted those cases where the Member State enjoyed wide 
discretion in implementing EU law and those where the margin of discretion was 
constrained. Instances of wide discretion involved assessment as to whether a 
‘manifest and grave disregard’ for the limit of the Member States’ discretion had 
been committed. In instances were there is little discretion open to the Member 
State, or where there is no discretion at all granted, it is significantly easier to 
establish a sufficiently serious breach. This involves the application of Lord Clyde’s 
non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account.113 Here, no one factor will be 
decisive or conclusive, although seriousness of the breach is demonstrably easier to 
establish in situations of minimal or no discretion granted to the State.114 It is also 
relevant to understand that the term ‘manifest and grave disregard’ does not depend 
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on the State committing an act of egregious conduct, nor does it require the finding 
of fault on the part of the State, rather it involves blameworthiness and should not be 
elevated to a search for moral culpability. Further, whilst previous cases have 
involved the judiciary in the UK attempting to adopt a very thorough analysis of the 
variances and minutiae of the administrative failure on the part of the State, this is 
not needed. Indeed, it probably harks back to the judges applying rules to prevent a 
finding of public authorities being liable in tort. ‘Mere’ illegality is all that is required to 
hold the State in breach of its EU obligations.115 
 
The application of the ‘sufficiently serious’ test in Delaney was interesting in that 
here, no wide discretion existed in the enactment of the ‘crime exception’ provision of 
the national law. The Court considered that no legislative choice was available as a 
defence by the State116 - it even went as far as to identify that the State enjoyed no 
discretion at all in the transposition.117 The language of the Directive was clear and 
obvious, the State’s attempted defence to rely on textual gymnastics to avoid liability 
was tortuous and unarguable, no degree of excuseability existed, and whilst the 
judge held that the Secretary of State did not deliberately intend to breach EU law, 
he was satisfied that by taking no advice on the matter, the Secretary had 
deliberately run the risk of infringement. This has to be compared with Recall 
Support Services Limited and others v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport118 where the State Liability claim failed. In Recall, the UK was held to be in 
breach of its obligations under EU telecommunications law, the Directive at issue did 
not attempt to define an exhaustive list of grounds upon which the Member State 
could restrict the use of equipment known as a GSM gateway. The Directive enabled 
legislative action to be taken ‘as defined by Member States in conformity with EU 
law’.119 This, by definition, involved the Member State possessing a broad discretion 
in transposition which made the claimant's job of establishing a sufficiently serious 
breach significantly more difficult than that in Delaney. 
 
Delaney points to a change in the judiciary’s approach to matters of State Liability. 
First, the case involves the infringement of what are known as ‘second order’ 
principles of EU law - it relates to a Directive rather than the application of a 
fundamental Treaty provision. Secondly, it is again worth noting that this judgment 
was provided in the absence of any finding of the Court of Justice that the UK was in 
breach of its EU obligations. This significantly speeds up the process of a claimant 
obtaining damages for the consequences of the State’s breach of EU law, and 
considerably reduces the costs incurred. Third, given the lack of discretion between 
the Directive and the required transposition into national law being so fundamental to 
the Court's finding that the UK was in breach to a sufficiently serious degree as to 
warrant the award of damages, this is particularly pertinent to Woolworths and the 
issue relating to collective redundancies and the requirement for consultation. The 
Collective Redundancies Directive required consultation in relation to 
‘establishments’ whilst the UK’s transposing legislation referred to ‘at one 
establishment’. Following the reasoning in Delaney, it would not be difficult for the 
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courts, if so minded, to hold the UK in breach due to the lack of discretion. Delaney 
and a case heard earlier in 2014 - Barco de Vapor BV and others v Thanet District's, 
Council,120 have both established successful State Liability claims. The hope must 
be that the judiciary in the UK no longer feel required to wait for direction and 
instruction from the Court of Justice in order to determine where the UK has fallen 
below the standard required when transposing EU provisions. 
 
8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has centred around two cases heard by domestic and EU courts in 2014 
and 2015. In Woolworths, the EAT adopted a purposive approach to the 
interpretation of TULRCA 1992 to give effect to a parent Directive, although it 
appeared to misunderstand the access to EU rights through vertical direct effect. In 
Delaney, the High Court followed a similar approach to a previous 2014 judgment 
when holding the UK liable in damages for losses incurred by a claimant due to the 
incorrect transposition of a Directive. Significantly, the High Court made this decision 
without the need for a finding of liability on the part of the UK by the Court of Justice, 
and made this decision on the basis of secondary EU law. A key aspect of the ruling 
and rationale presented in the judgment of Delaney was the lack of discretion 
available to the UK in the transposition which, held the Court, was decisive in 
satisfying a sufficiently serious breach of EU law (the second and arguably most 
difficult of the tests outlined in Brasserie).  
 
Individuals who are denied rights granted through the membership of the EU must 
have an appropriately accessible and transparent system of redress available. Many 
individuals lack the social and economic power to secure their EU rights, and were 
this not the case, the system of EU law reporting and education, in the UK at least, 
makes awareness of laws and existing sources of help limited, disjointed and 
prohibitory. Individuals are also affected in their daily lives by EU rights (perhaps 
most visible to them through social policy initiatives) which, when denied to them 
through inadequate action on behalf of the State, profoundly and adversely affect 
their lives, but are difficult to quantify financially. This makes the system of redress 
through State Liability as a mere damages action restrictive and largely 
inappropriate. National procedural rules and systems contribute to limiting State 
Liability’s help in achieving access to EU rights, but the change in approach through 
Delaney, and the High Court taking a lead in providing judgments against the State 
independent of an EU institution’s action or reference to an appeal court, is a very 
positive movement. 2014 and 2015 have confirmed the increasing viability and 
vitality of the power of the domestic enforcement mechanism of State Liability for 
vulnerable individuals.   
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